National Security Strategy Lacks Detail on UK Telecoms and Subsea Fibre

The UK Government has published its National Security Strategy (NSS), which may or may not confirm earlier reports (here) that broadband (inc. telecommunications) will now be considered part of national security investment in order to help reach a new NATO target for spending 5% of GDP on defence by 2035. Subsea fibre protection also gets a brief mention.

At present, the United Kingdom is already spending 2.33% of its annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence, and this is expected to reach 3% by around 2029. But NATO members will today discuss a new 5% goal by 2035, which actually reflects 3.5% for core defence (e.g. military hardware and personnel) and 1.5% on defence-related areas (resilience and security). The latter is where telecoms may soon come into play.

The Prime Minister, Kier Starmer, argues that the reclassification of defence spending reflects the fact that “economic security is national security, and through this strategy we will bring the whole of society with us, creating jobs, growth and wages for working people.” But there’s also no escaping the fact that it will make that 5% target much easier to meet if they can dilute it to include lots of other spending. In the past, NATO has tended to reject such approaches, but times change.

In fairness, telecommunications networks are already considered to be part of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and maintaining their security has been a key focus of recent laws, so there is at least some logic to lumping associated public investment into defence-related areas (e.g. the £5bn Project Gigabit broadband programme). Not to mention that most of us do depend upon these networks, viewing them as a critical service.

In addition, those vital subsea fibre optic cables that we all rely upon for most of our international connectivity are also a part of the equation, which is relevant because in recent months we’ve seen several seemingly deliberate attempts at sabotage in other parts of Europe (here and here) – with mixed success. The new NSS does touch on this too, albeit only briefly.

Section (1) – Defend our territory

4. An island nation needs to be able to control its borders and maritime environment. Security at home requires monitoring and managing who and what enters our waters and airspace. The UK depends on subsea fibre optic cables for 99% of its digital communications and approximately three quarters of the UK’s total gas supply comes from subsea pipelines. Our territorial security therefore begins at sea – from our ability to stop criminal gangs and deter hostile states to the import of food and energy supplies.

Fibre-optic subsea cables carry 99% of UK digital data

➤ 99% of UK international data traffic transmitted via subsea cables
➤ £65 bn of UK economic activity relies on the subsea cable industry including fibre optic cables
➤ Subsea cables provides 66 million Britons with access to the global internet
➤ The cost to repair a single damaged fibre optic cable is up to £1 m and £100 m for power cables per incident.

The Royal Navy will take a leading and coordinating role in securing undersea infrastructure and maritime traffic carrying the information, energy and goods upon which we depend. Under Operation Atlantic Bastion, we will counter the persistent and growing underwater threats from Russian submarines and the shadow fleet. Changes to our Rules of Engagement means our warships can now do more to track vessels we suspect of spying or conducting sabotage.

Under UK leadership, the ten-nation Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is increasing efforts to track potential threats to subsea infrastructure and the Russian shadow fleet at its Operational headquarters in Northwood. Our NATO allies are also helping us defend our waters through the UK-hosted NATO Maritime Command, as well as Operation Baltic Sentry, which ensures Russian ships cannot operate in secrecy near UK or NATO territory.

Despite this, it should be said that the new NSS doesn’t actually provide much in the way of any solid detail on precisely which bits and pieces will make up that 1.5% for “resilience and security” spending. Rural broadband has of course been mentioned as one of the possible elements, but roadworks and food aid might well be others. We suspect this may first have to be given a nod of approval by NATO this week, before it can be confirmed.

However, there will be many people who would still expect national security spending to be focused squarely on areas like the military (soldiers, drones, tanks etc.), yet the new approach – if confirmed – risks being a bridge too far for how we define such investment. We’re also unsure whether such a change would, despite all the talk of new jobs (likely a reference to other areas of the strategy), bring any tangible benefits for the broadband and mobile side of things.

At the same time, it wouldn’t be the first occasion where a government has utilised a touch of creative accounting in order to make something seem bigger than it actually is.